This study examines the determinants of public expenditures in advanced market economies by simultaneously assessing the impact of domestic political institutions and globalization. A distinction is made between collective veto points and competitive veto points, demonstrating that not all veto points have restrictive effects. It is shown that public expenditures are significantly and positively affected by collective veto points, whereas the opposite is true for competitive veto points thereby indicating that not all veto points are created equal. In addition to veto points, the effects of globalization are also assessed revealing that globalization is exerting little reform pressures on the welfare state with strong evidence indicating that more globalization buoys public expenditures. Current disbursements and social transfers are both positively influenced by globalization. These findings suggest that domestic political institutions continue to shape policy trajectories in this purported global age.
expenditures, it is crucial that the forces of globalization are examined in tandem with domestic political institutions thereby providing a more complete analysis of the predictors of expenditures than has hitherto been achieved. In addition, further alternative hypotheses will be introduced and tested later.
This study will proceed as follows: First, the theory of veto points will be critically assessed and a difference between collective and competitive veto points will be established; second, the central arguments on how globalization should affect redistribution will be examined; and third, the research design, the variables, and hypotheses will be developed, followed by a summary of the findings and of the implications of the findings.
RESTRAINING AND ENABLING INSTITUTIONS
Fundamental to the theory of veto points is that, the more of them that exist, the more difficult it is to change policy, or in Tsebelis's (1999) useful definition, "a veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo" (p. 593). Thus, this theory predicts that the larger the number of veto players, the higher policy stability, 1 or the more power is diffused among many actors, the more difficult it should be to affect policy change.
Typical examples of veto points are, for instance, the type of executivelegislative relations such as presidentialism or parliamentarism. Obviously, a president who is constitutionally protected by votes of no confidence from the parliament, such as the American president, represents an additional veto player vis-à-vis Congress, which consists of two equally strong housesboth of which can be understood to be a veto point. 2 On the other hand, the British Parliament and its mechanism of fusion between executive and legislative power and parliamentary systems with single-member district electoral systems in general constitute only one veto point, because the prime minister emerges out of the majority party in Parliament reducing institutional competition. In addition, the degree of federalism represents levels of veto points as well as whether countries are unicameral, bicameral, or have very weak upper houses, such as the United Kingdom.
1. Tsebelis (1995) also provided a very useful distinction between partisan veto points (such as the number of parties) and institutional veto points (such as federalism and bicameralism).
2. The election debacle of November 2000 and the controversial decision of the Supreme Court in Bush versus Gore clearly demonstrated that the U.S. Supreme Court may also be thought of as a veto point. One may even speculate on the degree to which the mass media has become a check on policy.
In the literature on veto points, the number of political parties has played a central role. Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( , 1999 , Tsebelis and Chang (2001) , Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) , Bawn (1999) , and others found that, the more parties are present in governments, the more difficult it is to change the status quo. Each party is understood to represent a veto point, and the more there are, the more unlikely it is that change in policy will result; in other words, neither an expansionary nor a restrictive effect should be observed. 3 This article will take exception to these claims and will argue that there are two different kinds of veto points-collective and competitive veto points-and that they lead to systematically different outcomes. In other words, not all veto points are created equal and have equal effects.
Applying the conventional thesis that more parties means more veto points, and thus a low capacity to change the status quo, we expect to find that the most generous welfare states should also be the ones with the lowest number of parties. However, this is not the case. The assertion that more parties mean more veto points, that is, very low capacity to change the status quo, is at odds with the observation that high welfare spending, decommodification, and many other measures of an extensive welfare state are associated with multiparty or oversized coalitions. If more parties mean more veto points, the welfare state should be quite minimal in multiparty systems and extensive in systems with single-party, bare majority cabinets. Tsebelis's (1999) explanation is that "oversized coalitions will be locked into the previous policy pattern (whatever that pattern happens to be)" (p. 592). Thus his claim implies a path-dependency argument. However, if his assertion is correct, we should observe, for instance, less spending, lower budget deficits, and lower transfer payments in multiparty coalitions or in oversized coalitions. Why? Because such party systems consist of many veto points, according to the locking-in thesis, such government largesse should have never occurred in the first place, because the agreement of many parties is supposedly inimical to the expansion of the welfare state. However, more government spending has occurred precisely in such party systems.
Bo Rothstein (1998) and Esping-Andersen (2000) found that welfare spending in the early 1960s was very similar in all Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries but began to dramatically diverge among the OECD countries thus leading to the intrigu-262 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / April 2004 3. Tsebelis (1995 Tsebelis ( , 1999 also examined the ideological distance between the parties arguing that, the further the parties are apart, the more unlikely it is for them to change the political status quo. The jury is still out on this hypothesis. Although Tsebelis found evidence of the ideological distance hypothesis, others have not found that ideological distance matters.
ing variation in government spending observable today. 4 According to the locking-in argument of Tsebelis (1999) , today's big spenders should be those with the fewest parties in government such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan-an assertion that is inconsistent with empirical facts. Thus, the locking-in argument cannot explain the dynamic change from a time where all OECD countries indicated similar spending levels in the 1960s to a fanning out into the intriguing, tremendous variation in spending levels observable today.
One may still argue that the number of parliamentary parties follows a different dynamic than parties in government. However, using the 15 countries of this study and the time period from 1960 to 1996, a pooled cross-sectional/ time series analysis of transfer payments as the dependent variable and the number of parties in government as a predictor yields a highly significant (p < .01), positive relationship clearly indicating that more governmental parties (not parliamentary parties and independently of their partisan coloration) have a significant expanding effect on transfer payments. Apparently, the conception that more parties mean more veto points, which results in less capacity to change the status quo, is inconsistent with the path-dependency argument and with empirical observations. In addition, significant evidence has been amassed by other scholars that indicates that more parties (driven mostly by proportional representation; Duverger, 1964) lead to larger government growth, higher inflation, and higher budget deficits and have generally expansionary tendencies (Birchfield & Crepaz, 1998; Crepaz, 2001 Crepaz, , 2002a Crepaz, , 2002b Crepaz & Birchfield, 2000; Roubini & Sachs, 1989a , 1989b Swank, 2001 Swank, , 2002 Tabellini, 2000) . 4 . Rothstein (1998) argued that, In the 1990s, the large European countries spend about 50 percent more [public spending] than the United States, while the Scandinavian countries spend about twice as much as the United States. This was, however, not always the case. In the 1960s, the difference between these countries in total public spending was much smaller-the level in the United States was about 28 percent compared to a mean of 29 percent for the Scandinavian countries. (p. 18) Similarly, Esping-Andersen (2000) made the point that:
. . . the decisive period in which the basic components of post-war welfare regimes were put in place, was . . . during the 1960s and 1970s. . . . The essential differences between the Nordic, social democratic, the Continental European, and the AngloSaxon liberal welfare states were affirmed in these years. (p. 4) If it were true that policies are locked into the previous level, then such dynamic change should not occur. 5. The Beck and Katz (1995) method of panel-corrected standard errors with a lagged dependent variable was employed. The coefficient is .12 with a standard error of .003 (N = 553).
Such expansionary effects are driven by rational motives of the coalition partners who have parochial interests combined with a tremendous power to potentially topple the government. Such a setting encourages logrolling with the effect that, even though it might be in the interest of the coalition as a whole to reduce government growth, from the perspective of an individual party, it is not rational to engage in less spending while the other coalition members increase spending. Thus, the actors are caught in a classic collective action problem. This has been clearly understood by scholars who study budget deficits (Alesina & Drazen, 1991; Roubini & Sachs, 1989a , 1989b . Logrolling occurs not only during coalition government but also during the process of coalition formation. In the Netherlands, for example, Timmermans and Andeweg (2000) reported that, "even when parties focus on the most important and controversial policies, such logrolls make it easier for individual parties to concede on specific issues" (p. 382). Nousiainen (2000) reported that in Finland coalition agreements are written in a "something for everybody mode" (p. 289). Thus, just as the collective action argument could be applied to understand why it is so difficult to reduce budgets for coalition governments, the same argument can be applied to understand why in coalition governments public expenditures tend to increase in proportion to the number of governmental parties.
From an institutional perspective and again examining government spending, Tabellini (2000) concluded that "social security and welfare spending is larger in proportional systems than in countries ruled by majoritarian elections" (p. 13). Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (1999) have found a similar relationship. In the American politics context, Barry Weingast (1979) argued that, where simple majorities are less likely to form, all inclusive coalitions pass higher spending bills.
This study argues that more diffusion of political institutions does not mean less of a capacity to change the status quo. It argues the opposite: More institutional diffusion leads to a higher capacity of changing the status quo toward an expansionary direction, particularly when examining government growth. Because parties in coalition governments share political responsibility, they might be called collective veto players. In the words of Robert Goodin (1996) , "Where there is a formal coalition, collective agency has been created, and all parties [italics added] to it will be judged . . . by its successes and failures" (p. 331).
In addition to the individualistic logic of logrolling, there are strong normative arguments that bind members of a coalition together. The sometimes lengthy negotiations over ministers, portfolios, committee chairs, and membership structures generally culminates in the signing of a coalition agreement, the purpose of which is to ensure that promises are being kept and that nothing is done to harm the immediate interests of the constituency of a coalition party. It also codifies a certain form of behavior by establishing an esprit de corps that has a material force beyond the logic of logrolling while at the same time raising the stakes in case a party intends to quit the coalition. In Belgium, sticking to coalition agreements is seen as the "morality of duty" even though they are not electorally binding. The moral principle of pacta sunt servanda ensures that the promises made in the "coalition bible" (the coalition agreement) are kept (De Winter, Timmermans, & Dumont, 2000, p. 322) . Coalition agreements in the Netherlands are taking on a similar sacred character. Timmermans and Andeweg (2000) reported that a cabinet meeting of the Lubbers I coalition cabinet (1982 to 1986) was once opened with the following words: "We open the Holy Agreement [meaning the coalition agreement] and read Part III, Verse I" (p. 382). Although this is certainly a caricature, it captures the morality of duty of those parties who have agreed to stick to the coalition agreement. Together with logrolling, the norms of sticking together and the political costs associated with being a party that might be responsible for the fall of a government or singled out as the reason for having created political instability leads to a common interest in maintaining the coalition, oftentimes accompanied with a weakened intention to exercise restraint to control each others' budgets.
Thus, we argue that shared responsibility, the face-to-face interaction of coalition members and the intrinsic interest to ensure that one's own party is not singled out as the reason why a government falls, together with the option of engaging in logrolling yields a lower capacity to exercise restraint in spending than when competitive veto points are involved.
When competitive veto points are examined, a different hypothesis emerges-one that is consistent with Tsebelis (1999) and many other observers. In competitive veto points, power is diffused by means of institutional separation such as federalism and bicameralism where different political actors compete through separate institutions with mutual veto powers. If bills get stuck there, the public perception is not so much a matter of a recalcitrant party, but an institution itself that provides an obstacle such as the Bundesrat in Germany (upper house) not accepting a budget bill, or the Nationalrat in Austria (lower house) to do likewise. If there are separate institutions with their own veto power, blame is not "personalized" as in the case of parties, but it is "institutionalized". Political actors can "hide" as it were, behind political institutions that have institutional vetoes, i.e. the "faceless" institutions themselves are blamed rather than the parties or some prominent actors within parties. As a result, such vetoes are less costly and thus, we hypothesize, should be used more and should indeed make it more difficult to change the status quo. Such institutions should have a tendency to restrain government, sometimes to the extent of leading to deadlock, immobilism, and even shutdowns of government. Empirical evidence for the restrictive effects of such institutions has been found by Swank (2001 Swank ( , 2002 and Crepaz (2001 Crepaz ( , 2002a Crepaz ( , 2002b .
Thus it is important to distinguish two types of institutional diffusion. First, political institutions can be diffused in such a way that governing requires collective agency in institutions that share responsibility and where the actors interact with each other personally. Hence, we call such institutions collective veto points. The central mechanism that drives this form of diffusion is the type of electoral system. More proportional electoral systems tend to create multiparty governments, whereas less proportional systems tend to create single-party, bare majority cabinets. It is hypothesized that such veto points should have less of a capacity to exercise restraint in spending and thus have expansionary effects. A second form of diffusion of political power is when power is institutionally diffused, that is, when the institutions themselves represent separate agencies with mutual veto powers that compete against each other. Exemplars of such a diffusion of political power are federalism and bicameralism. We call such institutions competitive veto points, which should have restraining effects on government.
GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF POLICY MAKING
Besides the nature of veto points, there is another strong contender that helps explain variations in the state's capacity to redistribute incomes-a contender that has given rise to a whole new cottage industry of political economy. That contender is called globalization, referring to the dramatic growth of trade, deregulation of capital controls, impressive rises in foreign direct investments, the increasing effectiveness of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization working zealously to reduce the role of tariff and nontariff barriers, dramatic migration shifts, and, last but not least, the terrific advances in modern technology such as in the fields of trans-portation, communication, and information. These technological advances reduce transaction costs to such an extent that moving the means of production to other parts of the world becomes a viable alternative and making products that were hitherto not tradable are now ready to be bought and sold.
Aside from examining whether globalization is really a new phenomenon, 7 the reason why globalization is studied so intensely is because theories on the effects of globalization on the viability of the modern state yield a variety of opposing, yet plausible, hypotheses. There are those who argue that the state will no longer be a viable institution, because its capacity to tax and redistribute incomes will be adversely affected as holders of mobile assets (owners of capital, professionals, highly skilled workers) will take advantage of low transaction costs and move their assets to wherever accumulation of profits is the most frictionless, that is, where the lowest wages, lowest taxes, and, generally, the least regulation are to be found. To contain this migration of productive capital, politicians will have to induce mobile asset holders to stay put by providing tax incentives, subsidies, cutbacks in welfare-state provisions, and other such means. Tax competition between countries will lead to shifts of the tax burden from mobile (capital) to immobile (labor) asset holders allowing firms to exploit existing differences between national tax systems and undermining the redistributive capacity of the state.
In fact, countries will have to compete against each other for attracting capital by offering lower wages and taxes thereby leading to a race to the bottom, that is, a situation in which welfare states are minimal and in which markets reign over politics. The relationship between political incumbents and business will become even more nuanced. The credible exit option of business puts tremendous pressure on governments to induce capital to stay thus making the position of business even more privileged. Realizing that significantly extending the scope of social provision, public consumption, and tax burdens will undercut the confidence of business in a profitable rate of return on investment, governments cannot afford to continue providing generous welfare schemes. The end effect of this competitive deregulation, so the argument goes, is a dismantling of the welfare state, its political institutions, and the social insurance schemes that have protected its populations. Globalization thus puts into much sharper relief the familiar argument about the struc-7. Some authors, such as Paul Krugman (1995) and Vincent Cable (1995) , argue that, in the late 19th century, our world was already remarkably integrated. On the other hand, there is a new backlash literature developing that takes a very critical view of globalization by arguing that the level of world-market integration is exaggerated and that local politics, cultures, and institutions will continue to put an idiosyncratic stamp on political outcomes (e.g., Berger & Dore, 1996; Boyer & Drache, 1996; Gourevitch, 1996; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Streeck, 1996) . tural dependence of the state on capital, pioneered by Michal Kalecki (1943) and extended in the 1970s by neo-Marxists such as Habermas (1976) , Offe (1984) , and perhaps Lindblom (1977) .
If these claims are correct, governments operate in "significantly shriveled policy spaces" (Prakash, 2001, p. 544) . However, as plausible as this view is, there is another, equally plausible view that argues precisely the opposite: As a result of globalization, there is even more need of a protective welfare state precisely because markets, and their unequal distributive effects, will be even more prominent. This view sees the need for government to be even more interventionist to compensate for the increased insecurity and inequality wrought by international market integration (Garrett, 1998) . This same view is consistent with a whole slew of scholarly works in comparative political economy that has argued for a long time that small, open economies have embedded their markets in corporatist and welfarist institutions to protect themselves from the ups and downs of international market forces (e.g., Cameron, 1978; Garrett, 1998; Katzenstein, 1985; Rodrik, 1996; Ruggie, 1983; Swank, 2001) .
The two competing theories on the viability of the state in the age of globalization laid out above make for an intriguing puzzle in need of resolution, but they also represent somewhat of a caricature. In an enlightening comparison of liberal market economies and organized market economies, Hall (2001) argued that many theorists on globalization assume that firms are essentially similar across nations. In fact, this is not the case; some kinds of activities can be more efficiently pursued in the low-regulation environment of liberal market economies, whereas other activities may be more efficiently pursued where there are plentiful mechanisms for nonmarket coordination. It has been demonstrated that innovation patterns were systematically different depending on whether they originated in liberal market economies or organized market economies.
Moreover, firms are not only induced by low wages, instead, they may compete for quality as well as price. In such a case, firms may find a comparative institutional advantage in countries that provide a highly trained and educated workforce that allows the firm to compete at the cutting-edge level of quality. In the words of Hall (2001) , they are engaging in "institutional arbitrage" (p. 71) that is exploiting the differences in institutional arrangements that lead to differences in the quality of the labor force as when American car manufacturers decide to locate their plants in Germany or in Austria.
Finally, the logic of mobile capital to go wherever allocative efficiency is maximized may only apply to liberal market economies in the first place. In organized market economies, the business community may resist deregulation "in order to preserve the institutional infrastructures supporting the kind of non-market coordination on which they rely for competitive advantages" (Hall, 2001, p. 71) . In fact, Wood (1997) and Swenson (1989) found that international pressures actually serve to unite labor and capital to protect the institutional advantages under which they both prosper thereby making organized market economies a viable alternative to more anarchic, liberal market economies.
One of the most intriguing observations regarding the effects of globalization on the state's capacity to independently create policies is the dramatic incoherence of empirical findings in this matter. Garrett's useful distinction of the literature into advocates of the efficiency hypothesis who argue that social democratic welfare policies will no longer be feasible in a global world and of advocates of the compensation hypothesis who argue that precisely because global markets are expanding it is necessary to have even more interventionist states reveals a remarkable puzzle needing further examination. This will be the task of the empirical section next.
RESEARCH DESIGN, DATA, AND HYPOTHESES
The spatio-temporal parameters of this study are the following: Fifteen OECD countries will be examined (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and the time period will range from 1960 to 1996 (N = 15, t = 37).
Three dependent variables measuring different aspects of redistribution will be utilized in this study, moving from the general to more specific forms of redistribution. First, current disbursements as a percentage share of the gross domestic product (GDP) will be examined. Current disbursements refer to expenditures such as public administration, law enforcement, public health, transfers, grant-in-aid payments from the central to local governments (e.g., to support education), and public works. It includes expenditures on law enforcement and some defense-related expenditures but does not include military expenditures that are part of government capital formation.
Second, civilian general government consumption will be utilized as a second dependent variable. This measures total government consumption of goods and services net of military spending as a percentage of GDP; for instance, it includes goods such as airplanes and paper clips and services such as school teaching and police protection purchased by all levels of government. However, it does not include government transfers such as social secu-rity and unemployment benefits. Government consumption, besides transfers, is the main component of welfare state spending as it includes wages paid to workers in the public sector. To employ workers that are hard to place otherwise in the public sector has been a preferred strategy of the Scandinavian welfare states. Such a strategy of active labor market policies affords an indirect access to health care and education, as opposed to the direct use of transfer payments, and may be politically more contentious than outright transfer payments (Iversen & Cusack, 2000) .
Our third distributive measure is government transfers that are sums of money specific groups receive as outright grants from the government such as social security benefits, unemployment compensation, paid maternity leave, and the like. All of our three dependent variables are operationalized as a percentage share of GDP. (For detailed operationalization and sources of variables, see the appendix.)
The three core theoretical predictor variables are collective and competitive veto points and globalization, the latter of which is operationalized as a composite measure consisting of trade (imports and exports as a percentage of GDP) and capital mobility based on the data collected by Dennis Quinn (1997) . These two measures were standardized, added up, and standardized again to create a composite measure called globalization. Both, the aggregate globalization measure as well as the two disaggregated elements will be used in the empirical analysis.
The gist of collective veto points is contained in the notion of institutional diffusion that necessitates collective leadership and shared responsibility for policy outcomes. Students of electoral systems have demonstrated that the type of electoral systems that countries employ has wide-ranging consequences: Proportional representation tends to yield many parties in parliament, which necessitates the formation of coalitions, which in turn affects government longevity (Duverger, 1964; Lijphart, 1984) . Giovanni Sartori (1968) called the electoral system the "most manipulative instrument of politics" (p. 273). Obviously the importance of the electoral system for the diffusion of political institutions cannot be overestimated. Thus, the first element of our collective veto points measure is the degree of disproportionality of the electoral system (Lijphart, 1999). 8 Secondly, the number of effective legislative parties is also used as a component of collective veto points and is very strongly related to the degree of proportionality of the electoral system. This measure captures the degree to which power is diffused in the legislature. Because in parliamentary systems cabinets are answerable to the legislature, it is also crucial to examine the configuration of veto points in the legislature. To capture this concept, we are employing the well-known measure by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) known as the effective number of legislative parties.
The obvious question that arises is why are we not using the number of parties in government as a central element for our collective veto points measure? We believe that such a measure is, in fact, an invalid measure, as it does not capture how much compromise and logrolling is, in fact, going on between the party in power and opposition parties. A case in point is the minority governments that were in power for long periods in the Scandinavian countries. Lijphart (1984, p. 61) showed that, between 1945 and 1980, 68% of this time in both Sweden and Denmark minority cabinets were in power. Minority cabinets, to govern, have to continually negotiate with nongovernment parties to stay in office and to solicit support for its legislative proposals. Thus, there is, in fact, much more cooperation, compromise, and power-sharing going on than the simple measure of the number of governmental parties suggests, which is used by many veto points scholars. Lijphart (1999) claimed that such cabinets look much more like oversized cabinets than minority cabinets, although it is very difficult to operationalize the issue-by-issue support that minority cabinets have to forge to withstand parliamentary challenges. Kaare Strom (1997) even went so far as to describe minority cabinets as "majority cabinets in disguise" (p. 56), meaning that they really are more like majority cabinets because they have received a firm commitment of support from one or another party in the legislature, although this party has opted not to take portfolios in the cabinet.
In addition, the parliamentary party landscape is crucial for another reason: If a coalition is about to come apart, most of the existing parties in opposition are potential partners for a new coalition. The more varied such a legislative party landscape is, the higher the chances that not only a new coalition can be created but a higher number of effective legislative parties also signifies more pressures on a governing coalition that there are other games in town. Thus, it matters for the effectiveness and survival for a governing coalition whether the number of legislative parties is higher or lower. If that number is low, coalitions might be maintained because of a lack of alternative coalitions partners. If that number is higher, there may be more of a willingness to quit the coalition and attempt to build another one with a new combination of parties. For these reasons, in addition to the fact that in parliamentary systems governments are answerable to the legislature, we have decided to use the variable measuring the effective number of parliamentary parties as an element of diffusion of authority rather than the number of governmental parties. This combination of measures, the electoral system, and the number of legislative parties is, in fact, rather similar to the one employed by Swank (2002) who called it "inclusive electoral institutions" (p. 77).
The third element of our collective veto points is the type of interest group system. Politics and policy is not only accomplished through use of the formal constitutional mechanisms that give rise to particular party systems and cabinets but also through extraconstitutional means such as the influence of interest groups. The type of interest group system, be it corporatist or pluralist or anywhere in between, can also be thought of as representing veto points (Crepaz, 2002a; Swank, 2002) . Corporatism encompasses many interests in few organizations and is based on informal, face-to-face, ongoing interactions among members of the strategic actors of capital and labor. Success of failure of social policy is generally shared among the social partners.
Corporatism very much represents the informal nature of relationships between capital and labor and the ethic of shared responsibility that is typical for social partnerships. In addition to the more traditional economic logic of corporatism-that is, the trading of moderate wage increases for full employment or the indexing of wages to productivity-and the institutional logic of corporatism-that is, its capacity to internalize externalities (Jankowski, 1993; Olson, 1986 )-various scholars have recently (re)discovered the moral logic of corporatism. Visser and Hemerijck (1997) have argued that corporatist arrangements are similar to Putnam's (1993) idea of social capital where norms of reciprocity, trust, and sense of duty and responsibility to other social partners are cultivated. Thus, although extraconstitutional, corporatism and pluralism have to be included, nevertheless, in an encompassing measure of veto points.
All of these three elements-the disproportionality of the electoral system, the effective number of legislative parties, and the degree of corporatism-have been standardized, added up, and standardized again to create a composite score that we call collective veto points. We hypothesize that the larger the degree of institutional diffusion, that is, the higher the necessity for collective decision making, the less such a syndrome of veto points should be able to exercise restraint in government spending and thus should manifest itself in rising public expenditures (see appendix for more details).
Competitive veto points are also operationalized as a composite measure consisting of two classical forms of institutional separation of powers: the degrees of federalism and bicameralism. It is expected that the more federal and bicameral the system, the more difficult it will be to change the status quo, that is, the more restrictive the policy consequences (see appendix for more details). Also, these measures have been standardized, added up, and standardized again to create a standardized score with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
It is important to remember that collective and competitive veto points are two different composite variables each with a consensual and a majoritarian polarity. It is the configuration of these three elements of institutions contained in this concept of collective veto points in which we should expect to find an expansionary policy process, because this is the arena in which political power is shared, where there is joint responsibility, where the actors meet each other face to face, oftentimes in different roles, and in different functions and committees. The nature of this form of interaction has a tendency to lead to higher cooperation (Axelrod, 1984) . It is immaterial that this form of cooperation might often be detrimental to the interest of the whole government as such (as when coalition parties refuse to cut their part of budget and impose on other governmental parties to go first, which is essentially a collective action problem). The point is that this set of institutions has a built-in tendency to expand the growth of government or at least reduce it less than other competitive veto points. Thus, it is expected that the more political power is institutionally diffused, the higher public expenditures; the more majoritarian they are, the lower public expenditures. Therefore, the predictions for this category of collective veto points is the opposite of what the traditional literature on veto points postulates; that is, the more veto points there are, the more difficult it is to change the status quo.
9
With regard to competitive veto points, however, the predictions are consistent with the literature on veto points. Because competitive veto points in this study are defined as separate agencies with mutual vetoes, the more of these agencies there are, the more difficult it is to change the status quo. Competitive veto points are defined as (the consensual element is mentioned first again) federalism versus unitary government and equally strong legislatures versus unicameral legislatures. Does more consensus in this category of competitive veto points also mean more rises in public expenditures? No, it does not. In competitive veto points, more consensus means more dispersion of political power by means of separate agencies endowed with mutual veto powers. Thus, the theoretical predictions of the effects of competitive veto Crepaz, Moser / IMPACT OF VETO POINTS 273 9. We have also examined the Political Constraints Index by Henisz (2002) , which measures the feasibility of policy change. It consists of the number of independent branches of government modified by the extent of alignments across branches of governments. The correlation coefficient between Henisz's measure of veto points and our collective veto points and our competitive veto points measure is .64 and -.23, respectively. Tsebelis's (1999) data on veto points did not include data for the United States, which is part of our sample, and thus, we do not report correlation coefficients. Applying Henisz's veto point data to our models yields weakly positive and insignificant effects on our three dependent measures.
points are consistent with the claims made by Tsebelis (1999) , Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) , and others.
Because collective and competitive veto points are clusters of three and two constitutional elements each, respectively, we have decided to also display disaggregated results. However, because all of these elements are correlated with each other, we cannot employ all three/two of the measures simultaneously for reasons of multicollinearity. We have chosen to display the results of the disproportionality of the electoral system measure and the bicameralism measure for the collective and competitive veto points, respectively.
Disaggregating competitive veto points, we selected bicameralism as a prototype of dispersion of political power. The effect of federalism (and, of course, of the idea of competitive veto points) is the slowing down of policy change. For the theoretical reasons laid out above, we would expect bicameralism to restrict policy change, as it should be more difficult to secure the support of two equally strong houses of parliament than when one is stronger than the other.
In addition to these three core predictor variables, other theoretically relevant control variables are also introduced: Given that the dependent variables measure the redistributive capacity of the state, the ideological stance of government parties must be examined. Many scholars have argued that parties do matter when it comes to taxes and welfare state spending (e.g., Castles, 1982; Kirschen, 1964) . Also known as the power resources theory, it claims that unions and left-wing cabinets should expand public expenditures, whereas right-wing parties and cabinets should have an interest in curbing the growth of the state by lowering taxes and increasing the profits of the owners of the means of production (Korpi, 1983) .
In addition, the state of the economy needs to be taken into consideration also. Unemployment will be introduced as a control variable, because it directly affects transfer payments and puts strong pressure on taxes. It is hypothesized that higher unemployment will positively affect transfer payments and civilian government consumption. Similarly, we also gauge the impact of inflation on our government expenditure measures and expect that they should be buoyed by inflation. In addition, the extent to which governments can spend may depend on how developed the societies are. Obviously, all the countries in our sample are developed; nevertheless, if we use GDP per capita as a measure of development, we do find differences.
Wagner's law, stated in 1883, only at a certain level of development can the diversion of scarce resources for welfare purposes be permitted. Thus, it is expected that the higher the GDP per capita, the higher transfer payments and the higher government consumption will be. As far as taxation is concerned, a similar positive relationship is expected. In addition, for the years from 1973 to 1974 and 1979 to 1980, oil dummy variables were introduced to gauge the effect of the dramatic rise in oil prices and the ensuing supply shock. Finally, the crisis of aging puts enormous demographic pressures on social welfare provision. To capture this dynamic, the percentage share of the population that is older than 65 years of age is also included as a control variable.
This study will employ the Beck and Katz (1995) method of using panelcorrected standard errors to mitigate the statistical problems generated by panel data for ordinary least squares regression (OLS). The greatest advantage of this type of research design is that it increases the sample size thereby allowing for a higher number of variables to be introduced without drastically reducing the degrees of freedom. However, this type of panel analysis presents particular statistical problems, because the difficulties of both crosssectional analysis (heteroskedasticity) and time series (autocorrelation) are compounded in pooled analyses. In addition, errors may be correlated across cross-sections at the same point in time. Beck and Katz (1995) have shown that if the error structure in OLS is properly corrected for, traditional OLS methods produce unbiased and efficient results unless contemporaneous correlation (when large errors for unit i at time t are associated with large errors for unit j at time t) is unusually high, which rarely occurs in practice. This is a time-dominant design (t = 37, N = 15) calling for control of serial correlation. Beck and Katz suggested using a lagged dependent variable to control for autocorrelation.
However, more recent research shows that lagged dependent variables tend to usurp much of the variation of the dependent variable and tend to "dominate the regression and destroy the effect of other variables" (Achen, 2000, p. 14) , particularly in the presence of heavy trending in the exogenous variables, which is the case in our data set. Achen (2000) described the effect of including a lagged dependent variable into a regression as acting:
. . . as a proxy, picking up some of the effect of unmeasured variables. However, the autoregressive term does not conduct itself like a decent, well-behaved proxy. Instead, it is a kleptomaniac, picking up the effect, not only of excluded variables, but also of the included variables if they are sufficiently trended. As a result, the impact of the included substantive variables is reduced, sometimes to insignificance. (p. 7)
Thus we have decided to use the Prais and Winsten (1954) transformation to control for autocorrelation rather than using a lagged dependent variable. The Prais-Winsten method uses a differencing method to remove autocorrelation and is very similar to the Cochrane-Orcutt method with the additional advantage that the Prais-Winsten method retains the first observation. Therefore, our research design uses panel-corrected standard errors to deal with heteroskedasticity but will use the Prais-Winsten transformation to control for autocorrelation rather than using a lagged dependent variable. In addition, our model also includes country dummy variables to capture country-specific effects. The results in the three tables include the effects of the country dummies, although they are not shown for reasons of space.
FINDINGS
The following three tables are divided into aggregated and disaggregated models. Aggregated means that composite measures were used for collective (consisting of three elements) and competitive veto points (consisting of two elements) and globalization; another composite measure consists of two elements, trade (imports and exports as a percentage of GDP) and a rank ordering on capital deregulation. The disaggregated model, as the name implies, provides estimates for the constituent elements of globalization as well as for one institutional element each for collective and competitive veto points. Table 1 demonstrates that, as hypothesized, collective veto points tend to buoy current disbursements, whereas competitive veto points tend to restrict them. The positive coefficient of globalization indicates that globalization, rather than reducing current disbursements, actually tends to increase them. Unemployment and inflation both show a positive coefficient, as well, together with the age variable thereby indicating that rapidly aging populations are strongly driving public expenditures. These three control variables are positive and significant in all of the six models only with inflation not reaching significance in the transfer payment model. Surprisingly, the percentage-left-cabinet variable fails to reach significance in any of the six models introduced, whereas the oil dummy variable is negative and significant for the current disbursement and the civilian consumption model but not for the transfer model. In other words, although the oil crisis led to decreases in civilian government consumption and current disbursements, social transfer payments continued to be unaffected by the oil shocks.
Disaggregating the institutional variables and the globalization measure yields very similar results with regard to the institutional variables. The pro-portionality of the electoral system and bicameralism has a significant positive and negative effect on current disbursements, respectively. Thus there is strong evidence that the more political institutions are diffused, in this case measured by the proportionality of the electoral system, the higher the expansion of public expenditures. The same results would occur if we had chosen the variable measuring the effective number of legislative parties. It is not possible to enter both of these variables for obvious reasons of multicollinearity. Both trade and capital deregulation have a positive and significant effect on current disbursements.
The general argument made throughout this article is that globalization is mediating the effects of institutions. Such a theoretical argument is modeled by using interactive (multiplicative) terms. In all three tables, such interaction effects have been explored, but no significant results were found.
The aggregated results in Table 2 show that collective and competitive veto points have highly significant positive and negative effects on civilian Note: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses (z scores). See appendix for data sources. These coefficients include the effects of the country dummy variables (n -1), but they are not shown for reasons of space. Complete results are available from the author. *p < .1, one-tailed. **p < .05, one-tailed. ***p < .01, one-tailed.
government consumption. This suggests that the more political power is diffused, the higher government consumption. In the disaggregated model, the single variable measuring proportionality of electoral system fails to reach significance, but bicameralism has the expected strongly negative effect. Among our two measures of globalization, neither capital deregulation nor trade are significantly affecting civilian government consumption. Inspection of the parameters in Table 3 , which examines social transfer payments, reveals a similar story: Collective veto points and globalization have positive effects, whereas in the disaggregated model, proportionality of electoral system has positive effects. Among the disaggregated globalization measures, trade and capital deregulation have both positive, significant effects on social transfer payments. Overall, these findings provide strong evidence that not all veto points are created equal; it appears that some have enabling effects, whereas others have restrictive effects. Note: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses (z scores). See appendix for data sources. These coefficients include the effects of the country dummy variables (n -1), but they are not shown for reasons of space. Complete results are available from the author. *p < .1, one-tailed. **p < .05, one-tailed. ***p < .01, one-tailed.
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DISCUSSION
We started out with two puzzles. First, if it is indeed true that more diffusion of political power means more veto points and, thus, more difficulty in changing the status quo, how is it possible that the governments that have produced the most extensive welfare states are exactly the ones that are generally characterized by higher institutional diffusion? In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were few differences in government expenditures between the advanced, universal welfare states of Scandinavia and the residual, liberal, Anglo-Saxon welfare states and the Catholic-reformist welfare states in the middle of the spectrum. A path-dependency argument does not assist either in understanding why a fanning-out process took place in the early 1960s that led to the intriguing variation among welfare states today. According to some observers of the veto points literature, multiparty systems should have a Note: Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses (z scores). See appendix for data sources. These coefficients include the effects of the country dummy variables (n -1), but they are not shown for reasons of space. Complete results are available from the author. **p < .05, one-tailed. ***p < .01, one-tailed.
higher difficulty to change the political status quo than single-party, bare majority systems. Empirically, however, the most developed welfare states are exactly those that display a larger diffusion of power than the residual welfare states. This study provides an answer to this puzzle by taking a closer look at the concept of veto points and separating them into collective and competitive veto points. Not all veto points have the same effects. What is termed collective veto points tend to have enabling effects. In other words, because power is widely diffused, it requires power sharing and that political actors interact with each other on a face-to-face basis, and because responsibility for political success or failure is carried collectively, such a configuration of institutions leads to a form of cooperation that easily falls victim to collective action problems. In such circumstances, a particular political action (i.e., insisting that other parties should start cutting their part of the budget first, that expenditures for one party's constituency are perceived to be crucial for the reputation of a party leading to a logrolling dynamic, etc.) may be individually rational but collectively irrational.
This study found strong evidence that this expansionary tendency of collective veto points is actually occurring. Competitive veto points, on the other hand, function in a manner consistent with the claims made by some proponents of the veto points literature. This type of veto points relies on separate agencies endowed with mutual vetoes leading to restrictive effects as collective action problems can more easily be resolved. This form of separation of powers, represented most clearly in the government of the United States, may lead to serious problems of accountability as the habitual finger pointing between members of the two houses of the American Congress and/or the president attests to or even to the shutdown of government as it occurred during the winter of 1995 to 1996. Some members of some branches of governments may even prey on the dynamic of separation of powers insofar as they calculatedly introduce dubious legislation knowing full well that the other branch will not accept it, only to shift the blame to the vetoing institution.
Whether legitimate or not, separate agencies with mutual veto powers have been designed deliberately by the founding fathers to restrict government thereby making the American Constitution an example of gridlock by design. Our findings are largely consistent with such arguments. In five out of the six models, competitive veto points (or the variable bicameralism) have had a negative and significant effect on civilian government consumption, internal transfers.
The second puzzle referred to the purported effects of globalization on the state's capacity to redistribute incomes and extract revenues. The preceding analysis suggests that there is very little evidence that globalization system-atically undermines the government's capacity to fund the welfare state. Neither current disbursements nor social transfer payments are negatively affected by globalization; in fact, the opposite is true. The variable civilian government consumption, however, did not indicate any significant direction. Perhaps public sectors may be increasingly forced to deregulate in the face of pressures from domestic or foreign private companies that can provide services more cheaply and more effectively.
This analysis has shown that political institutions continue to have dramatic importance in shaping policy trajectories in industrialized democracies despite, and because of, globalization. Different institutions refract the pressures of globalization differently. To better understand the dynamics of the welfare state, not only do the pressures of globalization need to be examined but also a more refined understanding of veto points is necessary to comprehend that not all veto points have the same effect and that not all veto points are created equal.
APPENDIX DATA SOURCES Dependent Variables (all as a percentage share of gross domestic product [GDP]):
The sources of all three dependent variables-current disbursements, civilian general government consumption, and internal transfers-to households are from Cusack (1996) .
Measures on Globalization:
Trade measures (exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) are from Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1997) .
Capital deregulation is a rank ordering of capital openness ranging from 0 (completely closed) to 14 (completely open). The source is Quinn (1997) .
Institutional Measures:
Collective veto points is a measure of institutional diffusion that necessitates the sharing of political power in a collective fashion. It is a composite indicator that consists of three elements: (a) the proportionality of the electoral system, (b) the effective number of legislative parties, and (c) the degree of corporatism. The data are from Lijphart (1999) . Each was standardized, and then they were added up and standardized again to create a standardized score with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
The competitive veto points measure encompasses federalism and bicameralism and was arrived at in the same fashion as collective veto points. The data for federalism and bicameralism are also from Lijphart (1999) .
